J'ai trouvé un article nommé Signaling games sur Wikipédia qui est relativement intéressant. Apparemment, the dating games is a signaling game as well... fait que si quelqu'un a le livre des règlements, je suis preneur.
One of the major uses of signaling games both in economics and biology has been to determine under what conditions honest signaling can be an equilibrium of the game. That is, under what conditions can we expect rational people or animals subject to natural selection to reveal information about their types?
If both parties have coinciding interest, that is they both prefer the same outcomes in all situations, then honesty is an equilibrium. (Although in most of these cases non-communicative equilbria exist as well.) However, if the parties interests do not perfectly overlap, then the maintenance of informative signaling systems raises an important problem.
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